On the Other Hand
On the one hand, my last post posits a relatively bleak view of the treatment our reservist and National Guard soldiers are receiving. On the other hand, having just read John Keegan's chapter on Alexander the Great in The Mask of Command, I do think we should keep in mind the scope of our Iraqi involvement. Whether it has been a mistake or not, it has hardly been the massive undertaking that one finds littered throughout the history of superpowers. If we move from Iraq to Iran or Syria, then we will be getting a bit closer. As it stands now, I think the Iraqi campaign stands most evocatively as a contrast with present American expectations and ideals.
Consider the army of Alexander... it was as close to a national army as one could find in those days, composed primarily of Macedonians and Greeks. Those that began the march to Persia were not the conscripts or slaves we find elsewhere in history, yet by-and-large they follow Alexander to the limits of the known world, the Indian subcontinent. On the way, their experiences in edged-weapon and siege warfare result in casualties in the tens of thousands, primarily deaths considering the primitive medicine then available on the battlefield.
What does this have to do with Iraq?
Well perhaps not much, but part of Keegan's thesis is that as armies are merely extensions of their society, studying those armies can give great insight to the societies from which they came (e.g. importance of heroism and religion for Alexander's troops, the lack of division of labor reflected in the lack a professional officer corps) . Turning that method toward today's American army reflects a number of interesting phenomena. We see the tremendous value given to the individual, as seen by the reporting of individual casualties each day and the prominence given to low-ranking prisoners of war. Powell announces "We are not occupiers" (contrast that with Alexander's "I am the king of Asia.") We're tremendously demilitarized, as seen by the need to activate so many reserve units, and the now obvious reluctance of many of those units to serve as active-duty forces. And, as many have noted, we see that even in an open democracy, the executive holds enormous powers and is given even more deference (perhaps too much) by the masses than normal.
I have a lot more to say on this, but I'll wait until I finish Keegan's book. The other subjects he focuses on are Wellington, Grant, and Hitler, and then he apparently posits a fifth type of leader, the post-heroic leader that we ought to be seeing now. After reading that I think I'll be in a better position to attempt an amateur application of Keegan's methodology to our modern military.
