Freedom as Autonomy

I've started reading Adam Swift's intro to political philosophy, and it is fantastic. In just a couple pages he succinctly made clear the basics of Rawls and Nozick, as well as the popular conception of justice as desert.

Now I'm in the chapter on liberty, and Swift is making quick work of unpacking the dual liberties of Berlin (the often confusing distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' liberty). I've also finally been introduced to MacCallum's triadic, which I'd heard of but never had summarized so well. Swift thinks the latter offers a better alternative to the false distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to" (since any freedom can be defined either way), instead proposing a three part definition of a freedom:

x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z

Thus the interesting questions according to MacCallum are: what counts as an x (i.e. what are the agents capable of freedom), what counts as a y (i.e. what types of contraints count; is poverty a constraint?) and what counts as a z (i.e. what are the acceptable goals and ends).

Within the debate, a particularly interesting analogue I'm noticing is between what Swift calls "Freedom as autonomy" and Berlin's fear of the potential totalitarian use of the notion, and what has been called in several of my law classes the 'paternalist' nature of the law. We never discuss judicial paternalism in terms of its potentially totalitarian nature, but I'm not sure they are actually different phenomena.