Proceduralism
Mickey Kaus has a good analysis of what he calls proceduralism, as applied to the U.N. and Iraq. Particularly worth noting is his recognition that those anti-war advocates who emphasize the costs of war and post-war occupation may be missing their own point:
The seemingly sophisticated focus, among antiwar types, on the difficulty of administering postwar Iraq actually undermines the anti-war case, in this sense, because it suggests that without those difficulties a war outside the U.N. would be justifiable. In fact, those difficulties are largely irrelevant to the initial question of procedural legitimacy.
He also points out that the difficulty facing the United States at the U.N. is not a result of the breakdown of international law. Instead it is in some ways a perfect example of the restraint that international law is supposed to entail.
[T]hat's what the international rules mean -- that we sometimes have to do things that are worse for us, including things that increase the risks we face. That's the price of having an international structure of law -- a New World Order, someone once called it -- which will be a handy thing to have when we're combatting terrorism (which we'll be doing for the rest of our lives).
On the other hand, from a proceduralist perspective (to which I do not necessarily subscribe) I'm not sure Kaus' analysis is complete. The options as he sees them are 1) the U.N. supports an American-led war; 2) France vetoes and American attacks anyway; 3) France vetoes and the U.S. abides by the rules.
In particular, it is this third possibility that Kaus did not fully examine. Even if Bush et al abide by a U.N. refusal to authorize war, there may still be significant damage done to the U.N.'s credibility within the United States. Remember that Bush almost didn't go the U.N. for Resolution 1441. It was only the efforts of Powell (and perhaps Blair) that involved the U.N. in the first place.
Thus if France (or Russia) vetoes, or the U.S. simply cannot garner 9 votes, the lesson learned might not be that American must sometimes bear the costs of abiding by international rules. Instead, the lesson learned might be that the next time a conflict arises, the United States should not involve the U.N. at all.
Kaus acknowledges this, but only insofar as the U.S. might "even to try to replace the U.N. with a new organization with better procedures." Isn't there another possibility? Perhaps the U.S. will leave the U.N. just as it is, but ignore it. That ought to be the most frightening possibility for proceduralists.
