Slam Dunk Case

I think this is one of the most interesting claims to come out of Bob Woodward's new book (which, by the way, has one of the ugliest covers I've ever seen):

About two weeks before deciding to invade Iraq, President Bush was told by CIA Director George Tenet there was a "slam dunk case" that dictator Saddam Hussein had unconventional weapons.

And Tenet still has a job because.... maybe the administration thinks it is better to have him on their side than out of a job. We certainly learned a good bit about whistleblower containment in my White Collar Crime class.

At this point I'm perfectly willing to place a good deal of blame on Tenet, and can accept the kind of incompetence that this claim suggests. But I have to confess, I find some of the other claims a bit hard to believe:

Bush also made his decision to go to war without consulting Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or Secretary of State Colin Powell, Woodward's book says.

Powell was not even told until after the Saudi ambassador was allowed to review top-secret war plans in an effort to enlist his country's support for the invasion...

That's just an incredible claim. I mean, I don't even know what to say about it. I just don't believe it, though I'm also not much convinced by Rice's tepid response:

"It's just not the proper impression that somehow Prince Bandar was in the know in a way that Secretary Powell was not."

I don't know if my incredulity is better attributed to proper skepticism of Woodward or to my naivete about how this administration operates at the upper echelons. On the latter, here's another claim that could raise some eyebrows:

The book also reports that in the summer of 2002, $700 million was diverted from a congressional appropriation for the war in Afghanistan to develop a war plan for Iraq.

Woodward suggests the diversion may have been illegal, and that Congress was deliberately kept in the dark about what had been done.

I'd really like to hear the administration's explanation. I'm perfeclty willing to believe there is a good reason, but it might be a bit harder to argue that the war on Iraq was not a distraction if funds were diverted away from Afghanistan as early as the summer of 2002.

All in all, just another series of unflattering claims about the administration's internal workings. Even if one likes the results they are achieving (or seeking to achieve), the quantity of these stories is a bit alarming.